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Abstract
Biofuels represent an opportunity for Brazil to exert global leadership by substantially
scaling up the production, consumption, and international trade of bioethanol. Africa
represents an ideal venue in which to do this, given its suitable agro-climatic conditions
and extensive land area. Brazil has consequently sought to establish bilateral partnerships
with African countries, as well as North-South-South trilateral partnerships involving the
EU and US. However, empirically grounded assessments of how Brazil’s leadership aspi-
rations have unfolded in practice through these partnerships are limited. In this article,
we examine Brazil’s potential to exert global political leadership, by analyzing its policy-
based, structural, and instrumental qualities in making bilateral and trilateral inroads
regarding bioethanol production in Africa. Interviews in Brazil, Africa, and Europe suggest
that both the bilateral and trilateral avenues have produced meager results. Lack of do-
mestic strategy and vision, economic recession, and a fragmented alliance network have
reduced Brazil’s capacity to achieve its ethanol diplomacy objectives.
The rise of major emerging powers has elicited considerable debate, interest, and
speculation in the ﬁeld of global change. Brazil, India, and China are challenging
the traditional dominance of the Global North, seeking to capitalize on their
newly acquired strategic assets by undertaking political initiatives aimed at re-
forming global governance (Hopewell 2015). The formation of the trade and
ﬁnancial G20s indicates their growing presence in key decision-making fora like
the World Trade Organization, while their deal-brokering role during the 2009
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Copenhagen climate conference signaled their emergence as pivotal actors in
global environmental negotiations. Despite the proliferating literature on the
implications of their growing status, empirical assessments of emerging powers’
leadership strengths and weaknesses within speciﬁc issue areas remain scarce.
Although studies have focused on their leadership potential, either individually
or collectively, in relation to the climate change regime (Hochstetler and Viola
2012; Papa and Gleason 2012), similar investigations are largely lacking with
respect to biofuels, which is a policy area in which Brazil is often portrayed as
a global leader. However, empirically grounded assessments of Brazil’s leader-
ship are limited, a lacuna that this study aims to address.
Brazil has a long tradition in biofuels, based on the production of ﬁrst-
generation ethanol using sugarcane as feedstock.1 Consequently, over time, Brazil
has developed substantial technological and scientiﬁc expertise for this speciﬁc
crop and production technology, which it has explicitly sought to diffuse abroad
through technical knowledge transfer, exchange of best practices, and private-
sector investment, otherwise known as “ethanol diplomacy.” For Brazilian policy-
makers, transforming the country into a world leader in bioenergy and creating a
global biofuels market are central political objectives (Dalgaard 2012). The pre-
requisite for biofuels to develop into a globally traded commodity is a market with
a constellation of countries not only consuming, but also producing, biofuels
(Dalgaard 2012).
The African continent is vital to Brazil’s ambitions. First, climatic param-
eters are important for the growth of energy crops. Sugarcane is a tropical crop,
so sugarcane-based ethanol can only be produced in parts of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America—that is, in countries located in tropical climatic zones similar to
those of Brazil. Environmental similarities between the agro-climatic conditions
in the African savannahs and the Brazilian cerrado therefore provide a familiar
agro-ecological context, which has prompted Brazilian policy-makers to explore
the replication of their sugarcane-ethanol model in Africa’s savannahs (Amorim
2010). This idea was the driving force behind ethanol diplomacy in Africa dur-
ing the administration of President Lula, whose prevailing view at the time was
that African countries could meet part of their energy needs by imitating Brazil’s
experience, albeit at a lesser scale.2
Second, geographical factors are pertinent, because Africa is perceived as en-
dowed with vast tracts of land into which to expand biofuel production (Dalgaard
2012; White 2013)—in contrast to, for example, Central American and Caribbean
countries, whose limited land availability effectively rules out investments of
more than 20,000 hectares.3 Finally, Brazil and Africa share afﬁnities due to Brazil’s
close cultural, historical, and economic ties with a number of Lusophone African
1. Biofuels from food sources are collectively known as ﬁrst-generation biofuels. Second-generation
biofuels are produced from inedible sources, such as woody crops, energy grasses, or even
agricultural and forestry residues, thereby avoiding competition with food production.
2. Interview #54.
3. Interview #25.
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countries, such as Mozambique, Angola, and Cape Verde. Indeed, business, lan-
guage, and the African roots of Brazilian black culture are considered key forces
behind Brazil’s drive to deepen relations with the continent.4
Several beneﬁts would ideally accrue from increased growth of the global
biofuels market. For Brazil, it would provide a leadership opportunity linked
to increased visibility, strategic positioning in an emerging global market, and
expansion opportunities for its commercial sector. Africa is envisaged to beneﬁt
through reduced oil dependency and foreign debt, as well as stimulation of rural
development and enhanced economic activities (Favretto et al. 2013). Except
for South Africa, ethanol production in the African countries with the greatest
potential for sugarcane cultivation exceeds domestic demands for blending,
thereby creating export opportunities (Johnson and Batidzirai 2012).
This article applies a leadership theoretical framework, alongside empirical
evidence, to evaluate Brazil’s quest to exert global leadership within the biofuels
arena, focusing speciﬁcally on its bilateral and trilateral partnerships involving
African countries. It draws on secondary data from government documents, reports,
and scientiﬁc studies, as well as on interviews with Brazilian, African, and EU stake-
holders. Primary data were gathered through ﬁfty-four semistructured interviews
carried out across Brazil (March 2013, August–September 2014, and September
2015), EU headquarters (October 2013), and Africa (October 2013, July 2014,
and May–June 2015) (see the Appendix for the full list). A purposive sample
and snowballing approach were used to identify respondents.
Insights from Theory on Leadership
The literature on international cooperation emphasizes the decisive role of
leadership for addressing transnational problems and forging global relation-
ships. Capability, legitimacy, and credibility are considered imperative lead-
ership prerequisites (Parker and Karlsson 2010), yet a range of (overlapping)
categories for evaluating leadership have been developed in the literature
(Grubb and Gupta 2000). Young (1991) identiﬁes structural, entrepreneurial,
and intellectual elements of leadership, while Underdal (1994) distinguishes
between unilateral, coercive, and instrumental leaders. Malnes (1995) focuses on
“threats and offers” leadership, problem-solving leadership, and directional lead-
ership, while Andresen and Agrawala (2002) expand the analytical focus by
considering intellectual, instrumental, power-based, and directional modes of
leadership.
Each typology mentioned above was developed to address different
regimes—for instance, climate change or disarmament negotiations. Conse-
quently, each needs to be “adapted to the characteristics of the issues being
negotiated” (Grubb and Gupta 2000, 19). Most typologies highlight capacity-
related aspects of leadership, the ability of actors to demonstrate the feasibility
4. Interview #5.
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of alternative courses of actions, and their ability to effectively employ negoti-
ation tactics, such as coalition-building. Here we utilize the typology of Papa
and Gleason (2012), because it draws on all of the aforementioned frame-
works, allowing for a better understanding of the leadership potential of Brazil
in the area of global biofuels development. The following paragraphs further
unpack the three dimensions of this typology: policy-based, structural, and
instrumental leadership.
The ﬁrst element of Papa and Gleason’s typology is policy-based leadership:
the ability of actors to “frame problems, promote particular policy solutions and
implement them” (2012, 917). It amalgamates intellectual and directional modes
of leadership, considering actors’ abilities to provide vision and goals, as well as
their determination to pioneer alternative policy solutions that demonstrate
(through domestic implementation) feasibility, value, and superiority, thereby
providing a model for others to emulate (Grubb and Gupta 2000; Underdal
1994). Such “demonstration effects,” or leading by example (Karlsson et al.
2011, 92), constitute an important soft-power tactic that Brazil has been noted
to use in the biofuels context (Aﬁonis and Stringer 2014). Policy-based leadership
for Brazil in this study therefore refers to its ability to instill the desirability of
integrating biofuels into other actors’ energy mixes. Disseminating vision inter-
nationally rests critically upon demonstrating vision domestically. Consequently,
high policy-based leadership potential is not only reﬂected in past credentials;
equally important, Brazil must demonstrate an ongoing commitment to a certain
domestic policy solution that has worked or is working well.
The second element of the typology is structural leadership. This concerns
an actor’s capacity to take actions or deploy material and immaterial power re-
sources that can incentivize, plus create costs and beneﬁts, in a particular issue
area (Karlsson et al. 2011). As Grubb and Gupta (2000) note, this type of lead-
ership is a function of an actor’s aggregate power—that is, its political strength
in the global order, plus its weight with respect to the problem. The latter di-
mension is salient because power tends to be “issue-speciﬁc” and related to
capability within a particular environmental policy domain. Altruism is not a
prerequisite, but while the leader is seeking to satisfy its own objectives (Malnes
1995), it must also demonstrate consideration of others’ concerns if durable
joint initiatives are to emerge (Papa and Gleason 2012). In our study, high
structural leadership potential depends on whether Brazil has the resources
and will to deliver on its pledges to assist African nations with developing their
biofuels markets in a socially, environmentally, and economically sustainable
fashion.
Finally, instrumental leadership refers to the ability of an actor to use dip-
lomatic skills to pursue issue linkages and to engineer winning coalitions (Papa
and Gleason 2012). While coalition formation is important, maintaining and
further developing these relationships is equally vital. Reliance upon integrative
rather than distributive bargaining is imperative, for the leader needs to construct
mutually beneﬁcial solutions (Gupta and Ringius 2001). High instrumental
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leadership potential, hence, depends on the ability of an actor to deepen coop-
eration within the coalition and attract new allies (Papa and Gleason 2012). In
this study, Brazil’s ability to display instrumental leadership rests on whether it
can successfully forge coalitions with other countries.
Brazil’s Ethanol Diplomacy in Africa
Although Brazil’s efforts to establish ﬁnancial, political, and cultural relations in
Africa date back to the 1960s, its prolonged economic rigidity did not allow
tangible outcomes to be generated until recently. Capitalizing on a golden decade
of economic growth coinciding with the beginning of the century, Brazil is now
making a concerted effort to engage with Africa and enhance its own investment
capacity and commercial presence, as well as its strategic and political weight. Such
inroads have not passed unnoticed, with Brazil’s increasing visibility as an inter-
national development actor being under close international scrutiny (Pierri 2013).
Two main narratives can be identiﬁed in the literature on Brazil’s South-
South engagement. First is Brazil’s ofﬁcial discourse, which stresses the un-
conditional nature of its development assistance (see ABC 2010; Banco Mundial
e Ipea 2011). Underpinning the governmental rhetoric is an idealization of
the way in which Brazil is acting in Africa, stressing solidarity, respect for the
counterpart’s sovereignty, and no development aid conditionality. Compati-
bility is often highlighted here—that is, that Brazil’s own development experi-
ences are similar to those of African countries, thus allowing the former to offer
the latter tried and tested solutions (Cabral et al. 2013). Biofuels promotion in
Africa is also underpinned by normative aspirations, with Brazil putting forward
the potential of this energy source to spur development.
The second narrative offers a more negative perspective, viewing Brazil’s
attachment to Africa as a new form of colonialism. By advancing the interests
of African and Brazilian entrepreneurs at the expense of, for example, African
smallholders, Brazil’s South-South cooperation is dismissed as yet another man-
ifestation of the exploitation of poor nations by more afﬂuent ones (Clements
and Fernandes 2013; Thaler 2013). Adopting a softer approach, Lima (2005)
emphasizes the instrumental role of South-South cooperation in maintaining
and further advancing Brazil’s own socioeconomic development via the promo-
tion of its domestic capital in global markets. Regarding biofuels, when Brazil
offers developmental support, commercial agents along the entire sugarcane-
ethanol supply chain are intentionally involved from the outset. This sets it
apart from US and EU approaches, which rely on donor-led support and refrain
from linking commercial activities with development aid (White 2013).
The Brazilian government has employed an array of tactics in promoting
the production and use of biofuels in Africa. It has made extensive use of pres-
idential diplomacy, especially during the term of President Lula (2003–2010),
who visited twenty-nine African countries, signing agreements relating to bio-
fuels along the way (Amorim 2010). The selection of countries was exploratory,
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with no coherent pattern; in almost all visits, Brazil would offer its help and, if
the hosts expressed interest, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) would be
signed.5 This explains why Brazil has agreements on biofuels with countries
ranging from Egypt to South Africa, and from Liberia to Kenya. As of September
2015, ten of Brazil’s fourteen cooperation agreements on biofuels or bioenergy
with African countries, mostly in the western and southern sub-Saharan regions,
had been concluded during President Lula’s administration.6
Brazil has also increasingly entered into trilateral cooperation, involving
African countries plus a Northern donor, with the intention of developing bio-
energy projects. At the initiative of Brazil, tripartite undertakings involving the
EU were agreed with Mozambique and Kenya (Aﬁonis and Stringer 2014). Sim-
ilarly, in 2007 an MoU on biofuels cooperation was signed between Brazil and
the US, with a subset of the activities envisaged being directed toward stimu-
lating private-sector biofuels investment in third countries. The initial focus was
solely on Central American and Caribbean countries, but later it expanded to
include African countries like Senegal and Guinea-Bissau (Dalgaard 2012).
Brazil’s Bilateral Path
Despite the potential, bioenergy development in Africa is largely still in its
infancy, due to limited capacity, food security concerns, and inadequate infra-
structure. With a few exceptions (e.g., Malawi), African countries have only re-
cently begun to introduce policies to leverage biofuel production. Policy
development has largely focused on promulgating laws and regulatory mecha-
nisms for compulsory minimum percentages of ethanol and biodiesel in na-
tional oil distribution circuits. Brazil is eager to further stimulate this trend,
because legal clarity is a sine qua non prerequisite for attracting investments.
Progress on the Ground: Brazilian Private-Sector Investments
Brazil’s private sector is behind several undertakings to enhance local reﬁning
capacities in Africa. In Malawi and Zimbabwe, Brazil’s private sector has pro-
vided expertise for the construction of ethanol processing plants,7 while in
Mozambique Brazilian companies Petrobras and Guaraní have acquired Cia de
Sena, a local sugar production facility, and are exploring the viability of construct-
ing a distillery. However, the investment required to modernize the mill is viewed
as prohibitive, with Petrobras reportedly regretting buying “a piece of amuseum.”8
5. Interview #54.
6. Bilateral agreements on agricultural cooperation with African countries follow a similar geo-
graphical as well as numerical pattern, with more than three-quarters of the twenty total agree-
ments having been promulgated during President Lula’s term. See http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/.
7. Interview #23.
8. Interview #41.
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In Sudan, Brazilian equipment and machinery were imported by local com-
pany Kenana, which, together with Brazilian ﬁrm Dedini, built a biofuels plant
that has met with considerable success. Sudan has been portrayed as a model of
sustainable biofuels production by Brazilian policy-makers, due to develop-
ment of an infrastructure that is said to have led to job creation, enhanced food
production, plus local and regional development.9
Finally, in Angola, Odebrecht teamed up with local companies, like Damer
and Sonangol, to build several ethanol plants,10 the ﬁrst of which initiated oper-
ations during 2014.11 In 2015, however, Odebrecht was convicted by a Brazilian
labor court of holding Brazilian laborers, who had been illegally imported to
Angola to work on the plant’s construction, in conditions akin to slavery (Reuters
2015). Odebrecht announced it would appeal the decision on the grounds that
the project was implemented by third-party contractors in accordance with both
Angolan and Brazilian law.12
It is notable that Brazil has intentionally sought (through MoUs) to
stimulate technology transfer and weave the private sector into its ethanol
diplomacy processes. Dalgaard (2012, 196) notes that this “formula of public-
private partnership” is central to Brazil’s energy statecraft, given the inﬂuence
and expertise of its agribusiness sector. While MoUs and other agreements are
crucial to strengthening biofuel collaboration in terms of technical or policy
implementation, actual technology transfers are largely executed by the private
sector. Hence, visits to Brazil by developing country delegations regularly include
a stopover in São Paulo for consultations with the region’s highly inﬂuential
sugarcane industry.13 However, when it comes to ethanol diplomacy, one cannot
study it using bilateral agreements alone, since biofuel investments in Africa can
also occur in the absence of ofﬁcial government-to-government arrangements.
For example, Sudan is one of only two countries in Africa (the other being
Angola) where concrete biofuel projects have been implemented so far (by
Brazilian companies). However, when Dedini built Kenana’s ethanol plant,
Brazil and Sudan did not have an MoU in place.
Brazilian Public-Sector Involvement
Turning to the public sector, Brazil has aimed to attract private investment,
mainly via conducting feasibility studies in African countries. Such studies are
provided at no cost to the African governments that request them and review the
prevailing environments for project development in biodiesel, ethanol, steam,
electricity, and food production. African governments then decide whether or
9. Interview #10.
10. Interview #2.
11. Interview #25.
12. Interview #44.
13. Interview #28.
S. Aﬁonis, L.C. Stringer, N. Favretto, J. Tomei, and M.S. Buckeridge • 133
not to push forward with the recommended projects.14 This is a manifestation
of Brazil’s structural power capabilities, and is signiﬁcant in terms of exerting
instrumental leadership through coalition-building.
While eager to promote biofuels, Brazil is well aware of the bottlenecks
posed by highly contentious international debates related to energy and food
security, trade, and climate change mitigation (Aﬁonis and Stringer 2014). Con-
sequently, Brazil adapted its structural leadership with respect to the promotion
of sugarcane-ethanol systems, conditioning the establishment of sugarcane
plantations for ethanol production on the proviso that they go hand in hand
with productivity gains in food crops, and that they only take place in countries
endowed with sufﬁcient arable land.15 Nevertheless, as the Senegalese case
study discussed below illustrates, the ability of feasibility studies to assess the
viability of producing biofuels in an environmentally, socially, and economically
sustainable fashion has not escaped criticism.
Until recently, all feasibility studies in Africa had been conducted by the
Getúlio Vargas Foundation (Fundação Getúlio Vargas—FGV)16 and were meant
to serve as tools for attracting international investment attention to the re-
commended projects. However, in 2013 a lack of tangible results prompted the
Brazilian government, through the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), to try
a “fresh approach,” by hiring US consulting ﬁrm Bain & Company to conduct
feasibility studies in the eight-nation Economic and Monetary Union of West
Africa (UEMOA). Bain’s ﬁnal recommendations were for the UEMOA countries
to replicate the Brazilian model, investing in sugar production ﬁrst, followed
by the production of electricity and ethanol.17
To date, feasibility studies have identiﬁed Tanzania, Senegal, Zambia, and
Mozambique as the most promising locales for biofuels.18 However, progress
has been slow, and none of the feasibility studies have led to actual project com-
mencement. Mozambique has attracted Brazil’s utmost attention, given the
common language, favorable climate, low population density, and its perceived
land availability. While Mozambique’s 2009 biofuels strategy articulated a
blending mandate of inter alia 10 percent for ethanol by 2015, ﬁeld research
revealed that, at present, there is no blending of biofuels with petrol or diesel,
and production of biofuels is negligible. Indeed, of the thirty-seven biofuel-
related projects that had applied for licenses between 2008 and 2014, only ﬁve
were operational, and all remained in the pilot phase.19 The failure of these
early biofuels projects is likely to have impacted negatively on the government’s
resolve to promote biofuels, while the recent discovery of massive fossil fuel
14. Interview #14.
15. Interview #25.
16. FGV is a higher education institution with a strong consultancy proﬁle.
17. Interview #26.
18. Interview #14.
19. Interview #42.
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reserves off its coast was perceived to have further dampened enthusiasm for
biofuels.20
While Mozambique-based Brazilian interviewees expressed their conﬁ-
dence that the country would eventually develop biofuels, such optimism was
not shared by Mozambique’s sugar sector. They cited the lack of (domestic)
markets, a competitive investment climate, and legislation as barriers to biofuel
investment.21 Even so, Brazil has made a concerted effort to assist Mozambique
with developing its own biofuels program and market, with MoUs on biofuels
development and renewable energy being signed in 2007 and 2015, respec-
tively. Despite the centrality of Mozambique to Brazil’s ethanol diplomacy vision,
government-to-government technical knowledge transfer has been rather limited.
Although Brazil offered its help to the Mozambicans, the latter never really took
bilateral cooperation to the next level. According to the Mozambican Ministry of
Energy, the 2007 MoU mainly focused on the exchange of ideas and on shaping
policies, which had included study tours to visit ethanol-related institutions
and companies in Brazil.22
Mozambicans justiﬁed their disinclination to proceed further in terms of
skepticism as to whether the different social, political, and environmental con-
texts allowed for Brazil’s experience to be directly replicated in Mozambique.23
For instance, food security concerns were central, prompting Mozambique to
seek the assistance of the Dutch in developing its biofuels sustainability frame-
work (see NL Agency 2014). For Brazil, this lack of technical interactions was a
disappointing turn of events, with concerns being raised that in the absence of
adequate infrastructure and laboratories, the Mozambican standards were “too
rigid for [the country’s] level of development.”24 However, Brazil’s advice has
been sought on some issues, such as whether to have a minimum-price policy
for ethanol or to attach ethanol remuneration from gasoline in the international
market as a parameter. Mozambique’s draft pricing structure was also sent to the
Brazilian government for review.25
Brazil’s Trilateral Path
In addition to bilateral arrangements, Brazil has augmented its instrumental
leadership by developing trilateral cooperation arrangements, whereby it pro-
vides assistance alongside a Northern codonor to a beneﬁciary country. Building
coalition networks with prominent actors in the biofuels arena serves instru-
mental purposes if Brazil is to achieve its goal of commoditizing ethanol. Under
the 2007 MoU with the US, feasibility studies were carried out by FGV in
20. Interviews #34, 40, and 48.
21. Interviews #40 and 41.
22. Interview #37.
23. Interviews #36 and 37.
24. Interview #41.
25. Interview #37.
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Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. While the former was never ofﬁcially presented,
because soon after its completion the country experienced a coup, the latter
proceeded as planned and outlined the advantages of projects for sugarcane,
cottonseed oil, sunﬂower, and soybean oil. Ethanol from sugarcane and bio-
diesel from cotton attracted the attention of Senegalese policy-makers, with
further project development awaiting governmental approval of the regulatory
framework.26
A note of caution is warranted, however, as a review by the UN Envi-
ronment Programme (UNEP) of FGV’s 2010 Senegalese feasibility study raised
concerns about whether all pillars of sustainable development had been assessed
equally. In addition to concerns that the study adopted a desk study approach
with a two-week ﬁeld trip, UNEP’s review also questioned the rationale behind
some of the proposed projects. For instance, although enhancing sugarcane pro-
duction in one region of Senegal was highlighted as feasible, the region faces
severe water shortages that might otherwise have led to it being declared unﬁt
for production.27 UNEP concluded that while the FGV study served as “a great
tool” for the private sector to identify investment opportunities, it was less well
designed to support policy-makers in devising adequately sustainable strategies
and policies.28
Turning to the EU, the current legal and political framework for bilateral
relations with Brazil is the strategic partnership agreement, established in 2007
at the initiative of the EU Portuguese presidency. Under the auspices of this
interregional collaborative undertaking, during the third EU-Brazil Summit in
Stockholm in 2009, it was decided to set up joint trilateral projects for bioenergy
and ethanol production in Africa, with Kenya and Mozambique as pilot coun-
tries. Brazil would lead on the Mozambican project, and the EU on Kenya. The
selection of these two countries was based on technical and political factors.
Starting with the former factor, Brazil was in favor of countries with soil and
climatic conditions favorable to large-scale sugarcane cultivation—that is, the
crop with which it has transferable expertise. Turning to the latter, the main
criterion was domestic political stability, since both countries had secure dem-
ocratic governments that the EU and Brazil “could trust.”29
The agreements to initiate these trilateral cooperative endeavors between
Africa, the EU, and Brazil have been reported in the literature, but so far no
evaluation has been undertaken of how they have translated into practice. For
instance, Franco et al. (2010) note that high EU tariffs on Brazilian ethanol
imports have partly stimulated the joint EU-Brazil decision to establish pro-
duction in third countries, and thus to engage in biofuels and bioelectricity pro-
jects in Mozambique. Bypassing the debate on tariffs and securing preferential
26. Interviews #10, 28, 29, 33, and 51.
27. Interview #53.
28. Interview #53.
29. Interview #54.
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access to EU markets has been also cited by Amanor (2013) as the raison d’être
behind these trilateral endeavors. Thaler (2013, 151) further highlights Brazil’s
“heavy dose of self-interest” in the decision to table plans for trilateral cooper-
ation with the EU. The above debate is consistent with observations that altru-
ism is not a prerequisite for exerting leadership (Malnes 1995). Our interviews
with relevant stakeholders, nevertheless, demonstrate that trilateral cooperation
in both Kenya and Mozambique failed to progress beyond wishful thinking.
In the case of Kenya, initial discussions took place between the Brazilian
embassy and the EU delegation to Kenya in 2010. These indicated a divergence
in terms of the desired policy outcomes from the project. While both actors
stressed the need to assist Kenya in promulgating a regulatory framework that
would provide for sustainable policies, the EU was skeptical of Brazil’s drive for
market expansion and creation of investment opportunities in the country.30
The EU also lacked an institutional mechanism for coﬁnancing trilateral coop-
erative undertakings in Kenya that involved private-sector investments in bio-
fuels. One interviewee indicated that at the summitry level, focus had been
on the political and strategic beneﬁts of cooperation, with the implementation
aspect having being overlooked.31 Parallel coﬁnancing, whereby actions are bro-
ken down into clearly identiﬁable subactions, each funded by a different coﬁ-
nancing partner, was eventually pinpointed as a solution.
In 2011, the EU Kenyan delegation decided to proceed by proposing to
DG DEVCO (the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation) a
scoping study to identify relevant initiatives that had already been imple-
mented in Kenya, what regulations were already in place, and the kind of
external support the country would require. At this point, the process halted.32
With the tide turning increasingly against biofuels as a sustainably sound
energy option, the trilateral undertaking in Kenya fell out of favor with EU
headquarters in Brussels, which ceased considering this project a priority and
repeatedly delayed authorizing the EU delegation in Kenya to proceed. When
the Brazilian embassy in Kenya enquired about the state of progress, it was
suggested that their headquarters speak directly with Brussels, which resulted
in an inconclusive reply of “we are looking into it.”33 As of July 2015, no further
action has been undertaken, indicating unwillingness on the part of the EU to be
further associated with this project.
Turning to Mozambique, the local EU delegation and the Brazilian embassy
initially discussed the terms of reference for a Brazilian-led study that would
analyze biofuels production in the country and serve as a prefeasibility study
for potential investments. The EU stressed the need to take into account land
grabbing and food security concerns, alongside the involvement of local farmers
30. Interviews #9 and 22.
31. Interview #22.
32. Interview #22.
33. Interview #18.
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in the production of feedstock, plus Mozambican small- and medium-sized
enterprises in the processing part of the value chain.34 As with Kenya, the EU
delegation highlighted a lack of speciﬁc ﬁnancial instruments to partner with
the Brazilians to coﬁnance trilateral undertakings in Mozambique.
Discussions, however, did not progress further, because the EU was in-
formed that the Brazilian company Vale would provide the funds for the FGV to
carry out the feasibility study.35 For the EU, this represented a potential conﬂict of
interest, as Vale’s portfolio included biofuels and the company had already
expressed interest in diversifying its operations into Africa. Consequently, com-
plications could not be ruled out, especially since private and public funds were
combined through the same channel to ﬁnance activities aimed in principle at
advancing Mozambican public wellbeing.36 Brazil’s retort was that apart from
ownership of the report remaining with its government, the sheer costs involved
in undertaking the study (≈US $1 million) necessitated private-sector involve-
ment.37 Eventually, Brazil proceeded alone (with Vale input) to produce the fea-
sibility study, and currently it is analyzing what private-sector actors could be
involved in its operationalization. The EU received a copy of the ﬁnal feasibility
study but was not requested to formally comment. Consequently, the EU is not
ofﬁcially associated with this output.38
Implementation Barriers
Unlike in Brazil’s ethanol diplomacy endeavors in Latin America, the low level
of agricultural technology, lack of infrastructure, and political instability were
cited as prime complications for scaling up biofuels production in Africa.39 In
most African countries the level of agricultural development is relatively poor
and based predominantly on complex and contested customary land rights,
as well as on smallholders that frequently switch crops and are not organized
in cooperatives.40 Lack of capital, infrastructure, skilled labor, and legal and
regulatory frameworks further drive market and investor uncertainty.41 Limited
local research and development is also important, given that the local varieties
of sugarcane differ from those in Brazil.42
Unstable political conditions greatly hinder investments, as Brazilian
funding institutions, like BNDES, face difﬁculties covering the requirements
and mitigation costs linked to dynamics such as currency ﬂuctuations.43 Civil
34. Interview #21.
35. Interview #21.
36. Interview #21.
37. Interview #18.
38. Interviews #21, 35, and 40.
39. Interview #45.
40. Interview #46.
41. Interview #39.
42. Interview #15.
43. Interview #4.
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wars, like that in Guinea-Bissau, are also a deterrent to investors. A Brazilian
delegation visited Mali in 2012 to discuss biofuels cooperation, only to hastily
evacuate the country due to insurgency in the north.44 Unforeseen events were
also highlighted, with Bain, for instance, postponing plans to present its study
ﬁndings to the UEMOA country governments during the summer of 2014 due
to the Ebola virus epidemic.45 However, one of the most important barriers
relates to the heated debate over biofuels’ sustainability that ignited in the late
2000s and led many African governments to shift away from biofuels.46 The
unexpected slump in oil prices of more than 50 percent since mid-2014, the
longest-running decline for 20 years, even further deterred many African coun-
tries from considering biofuel investments in the near term.
Discussion
Policy-Based Leadership
Having outlined Brazil’s bilateral and trilateral undertakings in Africa, in this
section we link back to the theoretical framework, to assess the extent to which
Brazil has been able to exert leadership in promoting biofuels abroad. Brazil has
clearly demonstrated policy-based leadership, by unilaterally setting an example
through the implementation of the world’s largest and most sophisticated
biomass-to-energy program. During the 2000s, Brazil was effectively the poster
child of ethanol fuel, but due to a combination of factors discussed below, the
Brazilian sugarcane sector has recently plunged into crisis. Consequently, even
Brazil has experienced a dampening of enthusiasm for biofuels, and this has led
to challenges in promoting its vision and direction.
First, dry climatic conditions, coupled with poor plantation management
and planning decisions, effectively crippled ethanol production in Brazil during
the early 2010s, fueling market uncertainty, driving ethanol prices up, and forc-
ing the importation of ethanol from the US in 2011 (Angelo 2012). Second,
international and domestic economic developments have affected Brazilian bio-
fuel production. The global economic crisis emerged when the Brazilian sugar-
cane sector was export-oriented and engaging in new investments to grow its
way out of deep debt. The turmoil that ensued effectively halted domestic etha-
nol production expansion plans, with the sector resorting to harvesting cane
from older, less productive sites instead of developing new plantations (Angelo
2012). Reduced average yields were exacerbated by the unfavorable climatic con-
ditions, culminating in an ethanol supply crisis that left the sector in disarray.
Domestic politics were not conducive, either, with President Rousseff ’s
policies being blamed as a main culprit for the prolonged period of upheaval
44. Interview #29.
45. Interview #28.
46. Interview #54.
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that plagued the sugarcane sector. Brazilian interviewees argued that biofuels
are not a priority policy area for Rousseff’s administration, which accords far
greater attention to the oilﬁelds that were discovered off the Brazilian coast
during the late 2000s.47 Indicative of the reduced priority assigned to biofuels
is the rapidity with which they have been subjugated in order to tackle more
pressing and immediate concerns. In particular, President Rousseff’s decisions
to control inﬂation by capping petrol and diesel prices, and by cutting taxes
on petrol but not ethanol, spelled a major competitive setback for the ethanol
sector.48 Precipitously low international sugar prices further complicated the
situation, with 10 percent of the Brazilian sugarcane sector suspending its oper-
ations during the 2014 growing season to safeguard against losses.49
A lack of domestic strategy and vision has resulted in the future direction
of ethanol as an energy option in Brazil being increasingly debated.50 While
several interviewees expected little policy change following President Rousseff ’s
reelection for a second term in October 2014, she subsequently took action that
was received positively by the sugarcane-ethanol sector. Ranking highest in
importance was the decision to increase signiﬁcantly the taxes on fossil fuels,
as well as the communication of Brazil’s ambitious climate change pledge for
2030 ahead of the December 2015 Paris summit.51 Interviewees, however, were
quick to downplay the extent to which these developments should be perceived
as indicative of steps toward (re)assuming a policy-based leadership position.
Increases in fossil fuel taxes were unanimously seen as a revenue-raising device
to reduce the country’s budget deﬁcit, while the pledge to increase the share of
sustainable biofuels in the Brazilian energy mix to approximately 18 percent by
2030 was largely expected, as Brazil needed “to have something to show.”52
Concrete steps toward implementation of the pledge will probably be under-
taken by future administrations. President Rousseff ’s overriding near-term pri-
ority will be to continue in power and avoid impeachment over allegations that
she disguised a widening ﬁscal deﬁcit as she campaigned for reelection.53
Inevitably, Brazil’s ethanol diplomacy has been impacted by this domestic
standstill. While some interviewees noted that ethanol diplomacy has now
retracted into a lower-priority issue, others argued that it had gradually died
off in the aftermath of President Rousseff ’s ascendance to power. She was
regularly portrayed as a fossil-fuel-oriented person with strong ties to the oil
industry, disinclined to follow in President Lula’s footsteps when it came to pro-
moting ethanol abroad. For instance, Casa Civil’s54 staff dedicated to ethanol
47. Interviews #24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 49, and 54.
48. Interview #27.
49. Interview #27.
50. Interviews #13, 24, 27, 29, and 30.
51. Interviews #47, 48, and 49.
52. Interviews #43, 46, 48, and 49.
53. Interviews #44 and 49.
54. The Executive Ofﬁce of the President of Brazil.
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diplomacy affairs under the Lula administration were reassigned to other duties,55
with ethanol diplomacy left in the hands of ministry-level bureaucrats who
have attempted to keep it aﬂoat in the absence of positive presidential leadership,
vision, and coordination.56 In terms of policy-based leadership, Brazil has not
been sending positive signals to the countries where it wants to promote biofuels,
leading to messages that can be problematic and confusing. Brazil’s struggle to
conceptualize its domestic vision with respect to biofuels has caused suspicion
among some African partners,57 and if this remains unchecked, it could taint
Brazil’s credibility as a global biofuel leader. Following that, a reconceptualization
of Brazil’s international vision might also be warranted, as indicated by our
Mozambican case study ﬁndings.
Structural Leadership
Even though its political strength in the global order is only a fraction of, for
example, China’s, Brazil still has the resources and scientiﬁc expertise required
to successfully pursue biofuels abroad. This was especially true for Lula’s ad-
ministration, which supported key ethanol diplomacy actors—for instance,
the Brazilian Cooperation Agency—with sizable budgetary increases.58 As one
interviewee noted, “if you needed to go to Africa, Europe or Asia two times a
month, he would give you the money to do it.”59 However, a note of caution is
necessary here. Despite the allocation of signiﬁcant resources, the leadership
task at hand was viewed by Brazil’s policy circles at the time as greatly exceeding
the country’s human and ﬁnancial structural capabilities. Complaints were often
voiced in ministries that “every time Lula comes back, we have another MoU.”60
Additionally, handling an ever-increasing inﬂux of foreign delegations made
heavy demands on the available resources: “We received ﬁve or six delegations
a month. It was too much, we were overwhelmed. Our staff on renewables …
was only about six people.”61
Under the Rousseff administration, Brazil’s economic outlook has dark-
ened considerably, with inter alia falling domestic demand, high inﬂation,
and deteriorating investor conﬁdence having pushed the country to the brink
of recession.62 Consequently, Brazil’s aid budget has been massively reduced,
such that technical cooperation assistance requests from (particularly) African
countries have been declined.63 The Ministry of Agriculture’s overall budget
55. Interview #54.
56. Interviews #24, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30.
57. Interview #27.
58. Interviews #50 and 54.
59. Interview #48.
60. Anonymous interview.
61. Interview #48.
62. The Economist, December 1, 2015.
63. Interviews #50 and 54.
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for cooperation has been more than halved, constraining its ability to pursue
projects on biofuels in Brazil that could potentially be extended to Africa.64
Another interviewee noted that nowadays they simply respond to requests for
assistance, whereas in the past they had been far more proactive.65
Budgetary constraints have also impacted capacity-building and dissemi-
nation activities, primarily toward African and Latin American countries. In
2008 the Brazilian Agricultural Research Cooperation (Embrapa) set up per-
manent ofﬁces in Accra, Ghana, to tackle in a more systematic manner the
continuous ﬂow of requests from African countries interested in Brazil’s tech-
nical expertise in tropical agriculture. However, this bureau is underfunded
and understaffed, prompting one interviewee to dismiss it as a public relations
exercise.66 Furthermore, the hosting of the 2013 Bioenergy Week in Brasilia was
only possible because it was organized under the auspices of the Global Bio-
energy Partnership (GBEP) and sponsored by, inter alia, the US and the
Organization of American States.67 Similar events, such as the São Paulo Ethanol
Weeks of 2008 and 2009, had been ﬁnanced primarily by the Brazilian gov-
ernment, but were subsequently discontinued due to budgetary issues.68 Con-
sequently, ministries eager to spearhead such events need to “diversify and be
creative” to secure funding, relying on partnerships with international initiatives
like GBEP, intergovernmental organizations, and private-sector actors.69
A ﬁnal point regarding structural leadership concerns Brazil’s sugarcane
industry sector, a key (ﬁnancial) government ally when it comes to ethanol di-
plomacy. Although bilateral cooperation is supported by government diplomacy,
it is implemented by the private sector. Successful ethanol diplomacy therefore
presupposes a healthy sugarcane industry. However, domestic constraints mean
that for the past few years the industry has been operating at a loss. Current
conditions thereby largely rule out pursuing investment opportunities abroad.70
Overall, Brazil is drawing heavily on its past track record with regard to its struc-
tural leadership credentials, which remain threatened by funding cuts and an
ailing private sector.
Instrumental Leadership
In closing, Brazil’s record of instrumental leadership has been mixed, charac-
terized by the dynamics of its coalition network. Several highly ambitious pro-
jects have ﬂoundered, with those in Ghana and Tanzania serving as examples.
In the former, although plans by Odebrecht in 2010 to build an ethanol plant
64. Interview #27.
65. Interview #29.
66. Interview #30.
67. Interview #27.
68. Interview #27.
69. Interview #28.
70. Interviews #23 and 48.
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had secured ﬁnancial approval by BNDES, the project was not implemented
when one of its Ghanaian partners went bankrupt.71 Tanzania had been ear-
marked by Brazilian policy-makers as possessing great potential for biofuels
production.72 Following requests for assistance, Brazil initiated an FGV-led fea-
sibility study in the Ruﬁji valley. In addition, Petrobras was to carry out a via-
bility study for blending, with an MoU to this effect signed during President
Lula’s visit to Tanzania in 2010. The FGV study remained at draft stage, while
the Petrobras one was completed—indicating potential for up to 9-percent
blends—but preliminary tests were never carried out. The stalemate was largely
attributed to a loss of interest on the part of Tanzania’s government, due to the
concurrent discovery of vast offshore natural gas deposits.73
Setbacks aside, Brazil’s direct presence in Africa is currently limited to a
handful of countries (Mozambique, Angola, and Sudan), while a few others,
like Zimbabwe and Malawi, have accessed Brazil’s expertise in the construction
of ethanol-processing plants. The overall results have been meager at best, with
Mozambique, Brazil’s ﬂagship ethanol diplomacy endeavor, serving as an illus-
trative example. In addition, FGV’s feasibility studies have not yet led to con-
crete results, and the same is true for many MoUs signed with various African
countries. Only 10–20 percent of the more than seventy MoUs negotiated by
Brazil with countries worldwide have actually led to active cooperation.74
While engagement with Africa to date may not have lived up to expecta-
tions, recent years have seen some renewed effort on the part of Brazil to stim-
ulate ethanol diplomacy undertakings, as evidenced, for example, by the 2013
BNDES decision to invest in Bain’s feasibility studies in West Africa. Moving
from a national to a regional focus was seen as a way of taking things forward,
with the partnership with GBEP envisaged as another tool in facilitating this
transition. The 2013 Bioenergy Week in Brasilia, as well as its sequel in Maputo,
Mozambique, in May 2014, allowed Brazil to network with Latin American and
African countries.75 In May 2015, Brazil again relied on its partnership with
GBEP to organize a similar event in Asia, held in Medan, Indonesia.
Turning to trilateral cooperation, while Brazil has put in place an expan-
sive alliance with the US, it has struggled to form a lasting and viable coalition
with the EU due to the latter’s sustainability concerns. Although we do not dis-
miss the basic values (e.g., environmental) underlying the EU’s approach toward
biofuels, an interest-based perspective could help provide a more complete
understanding of how an actor’s preferences concerning international environ-
mental cooperation are shaped. In this regard, our research suggests that the
EU was skeptical about being part of projects that would beneﬁt Brazil’s long-
term commercial interests. The objective of the EU was not to ﬁnance business
71. Interview #28.
72. Interview #14.
73. Interview #23.
74. Interview #29.
75. Interview #28.
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opportunities for Brazil76 or to contribute to the development of an interna-
tional biofuels market under Brazil’s leadership.77 While the EU welcomed
any Brazilian biofuel-related activities that could realize sustainable beneﬁts
for African people, it was not inclined to fund them. As one EU ofﬁcial explained,
“Brazil will go on and search for other partners, but the EU is not getting on
this train.”78
An important ﬁnding emerging from our study concerns the perceived dif-
ﬁculty faced by Brazilian policy-makers when trying to interact and cooperate
with their EU counterparts. In trilateral cooperation endeavors, the expressed
feeling was that “we talk, we talk, but we don’t go for concrete actions.”79
Brazilian policy-makers in Brussels argued that DG DEVCO, which is the pro-
vider of funds for development cooperation, blocked biofuel undertakings in
Africa on sustainability grounds.80 This was nevertheless deemed confusing,
since other DGs were engaged in biofuel cooperation with Brazil on other
fronts.81 Interviewees drew parallels with the trilateral biofuel undertakings in
Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean that involved the US as a codonor.
The view was that the US “is more proactive, we see a clear intention to go to the
next step: implementation.”82 Consequently, various projects and dissemina-
tion activities are taking place in the aforementioned regions, albeit not at great
scale.83
Conclusions
In this article we examined Brazil’s potential to exert leadership through its
bilateral and trilateral efforts to promote biofuels in Africa. Apart from the
notable exceptions of Angola and Sudan, the bilateral avenue has barely
moved beyond political deliberations and feasibility studies, while the tri-
lateral approach involving the EU has struggled to get off the ground. In terms
of Brazil’s leadership potential, an evaluation of Brazil’s bilateral and trilateral
undertakings in Africa demonstrated that in terms of policy-based leadership,
a lack of vision and direction is apparent. Regarding structural power, Brazil
has the material and scientiﬁc resources required, but the domestic situation
and budget constraints have limited the abilities of public- and private-sector
76. Interview #21.
77. Interview #22.
78. Interview #8.
79. Interview #14; see also #1.
80. Interview #18.
81. Interviews #15 and 20.
82. Interview #14.
83. Interviews #15 and 20. These activities have predominantly involved workshops and other
technical knowledge transfer initiatives. Some concrete projects have also been implemented.
For example, under the US-Brazil MoU, El Salvador has received state-of-the-art technology to
reinforce its ethanol production capacity, and Honduras inaugurated the country’s ﬁrst ethanol
pilot plant in July 2014 with the assistance of Brazil, the US, and OAS.
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actors to engage in biofuel activities abroad. Finally, in terms of instrumental
leadership, while Brazil has had successes in terms of coalition-building, the EU’s
disinclination to participate in trilateral biofuel undertakings constrains the reach
of Brazil’s ethanol diplomacy discourses.
Brazil’s attempt to exert global leadership has been compromised by the
signiﬁcant change in the international perception of biofuels and the dynamics
of the global political economy. Although Brazil can do little to alter this, the
perplexing domestic biofuel policy situation does not send appropriate signals
to potential partner countries. For Brazil to achieve its global leadership goal in
the biofuels arena, a vital ﬁrst step will be the reconsolidation of a domestic
vision. Doing so will enable Brazil to take advantage of technological innova-
tions in advanced biofuels that could change the tide with respect to biofuels in
the international scene.84
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Appendix (List of interviews)
No. Date City Mode Actor
1 October 2011 Brussels FtF* Brazilian Delegation
to the EU
2 February 2013 São Paulo FtF University of São Paulo
3 February 2013 São Paulo FtF University of São Paulo
4 February 2013 Rio de Janeiro FtF BNDES
5 February 2013 Rio de Janeiro FtF CENPES/Petrobras
6 February 2013 Rio de Janeiro FtF CENPES/Petrobras
7 March 2013 Rio de Janeiro FtF Petrobras
Biocombustível
8 March 2013 Brasilia FtF EU Delegation
to Brazil
9 March 2013 Brasilia FtF EU Delegation
to Brazil
10 March 2013 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of
External Relations
11 March 2013 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of
Environment
12 March 2013 Brasilia FtF EU Delegation to Brazil
13 March 2013 Brasilia FtF University of Brasilia
14 March 2013 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry
of Mining & Energy
15 March 2013 Piracicaba FtF Sugarcane Research
Center (CTC)
16 April 2013 Brussels FtF UNICA
17 September 2013 Telephone DG Trade
18 September 2013 Brussels FtF Brazilian Delegation to
the EU
19 October 2013 Brussels FtF DG Energy
20 October 2013 Brussels FtF UNICA
21 October 2013 Telephone EU Delegation
to Mozambique
22 October 2013 Telephone EU Delegation
to Kenya
23 July 2014 Dar es Salaam FtF Embassy of Brazil to
Tanzania
24 August 2014 São Paulo FtF University of São Paulo
25 August 2014 São Paulo FtF FGV
26 August 2014 Rio de Janeiro FtF BNDES
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Appendix (Continued)
No. Date City Mode Actor
27 September 2014 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of
Agriculture
28 September 2014 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of
External Relations
29 September 2014 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of
Mining & Energy
30 September 2014 Brasilia FtF FGV
31 September 2014 Brasilia FtF EU Delegation to Brazil
32 September 2014 Telephone GranBio (Alagoas)
33 September 2014 Brasilia FtF US Embassy to Brazil
34 May 2015 Maputo FtF Universidade
Eduardo Mondlane
35 May 2015 Maputo FtF EU Delegation to
Mozambique
36 June 2015 Maputo FtF Ministry of Agriculture/
Food Security
37 June 2015 Maputo FtF Ministry of Energy
38 June 2015 Maputo FtF Sugar estate
39 June 2015 Maputo FtF Sugar mill
40 June 2015 Maputo FtF Embassy of Brazil to
Mozambique
41 June 2015 Telephone Energy
consultant
42 June 2015 Maputo FtF Independent Energy
consultant
43 September 2015 São Paulo FtF UNICA
44 September 2015 São Paulo FtF Odebrecht
45 September 2015 Campinas FtF CTBE
46 September 2015 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of
Agriculture
47 September 2015 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of
External Relations
48 September 2015 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Ministry of
Mining & Energy
49 September 2015 Brasilia FtF UNICA
50 September 2015 Brasilia FtF Brazilian Cooperation
Agency (ABC)
51 September 2015 Brasilia FtF US Embassy to Brazil
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Appendix (Continued)
No. Date City Mode Actor
52 September 2015 Brasilia FtF EU Delegation to Brazil
53 September 2015 Email UNEP
54 October 2015 Telephone Casa Civil
*Face-to-face.
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